Secure function computation has been thoroughly studied and optimized in the past decades. We extend techniques used for secure computation to simulate arbitrary protocols involving a mediator. The key feature of our notion of simulation is that it is bidirectional: not only does the simulation produce only outputs that could happen in the original protocol, but the simulation produces all such outputs. In a synchronous system, it can be shown that this requirement can already be achieved by the standard notion of secure computation. However, in an asynchronous system, new subtleties arise because the scheduler can influence the output. We provide a construction that is secure if n > 4t, where t is the number malicious agents, which is provably the best possible. We also show that our construction satisfies additional security properties even if 3t < n ≤ 4t.
Introduction
In a distributed system, agents often want to be able to carry out a computation without revealing any private information. There has been a great deal of work showing how and to what extent this can be done. We briefly review the most relevant work here.
Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Widgerson [1988] (BGW from now on) showed that, if n > 3t, then every function f of n inputs can be securely computed by n agents in a synchronous system with private communication channels, where "securely computed" means that no coalition of at most t malicious agents can either (a) prevent the honest agents from correctly computing the output of f given their inputs (assuming some fixed inputs for malicious agents who do not provide inputs) or (b) learn anything about the inputs of the honest agents (beyond what can be concluded from the output of f ). The notion of an agent "not learning anything" is formalized by comparing what happens in the actual computation to what could have happened had there been a trusted third party (which we here call a mediator ) who will calculate f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) after being given the input x i by agent i, for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, roughly speaking, the malicious agents do not learn anything if the distribution of outputs in the actual computation could have also resulted in the computation with a mediator if the malicious agents had given the appropriate input to the mediator.
Ben-Or, Canetti and Goldreich [1993] (BCG from now on) proved analogous results in the asynchronous case. Asynchrony raises new subtleties. For example, agent i cannot tell if the fact that he has received no messages from another agent j (which means that i cannot use j's input in computing f ) is due to the fact that j is malicious or that its messages have not yet arrived. Roughly speaking, when defining secure function computation in an asynchronous setting, BCG require that for every scheduler σ e and set T of malicious agents, no matter what the agents in T do, the resulting distribution over outputs could have also resulted in the computation with a mediator if the malicious agents had given the appropriate input to the mediator.
BCG show that, in asynchronous systems, if n > 4t, the malicious agents cannot prevent the honest agents from correctly computing the output of f given their inputs, nor can the malicious agents learn anything about the inputs of the honest agents. Ben-Or, Kelmer and Rabin [1994] (BKR from now on) then showed if we are willing to tolerate a small probability ǫ > 0 that the agents do not correctly compute f or that the malicious agents learn something, then we can achieve this if n > 3t. BCG and BKR also prove matching lower bounds for their results, showing that we really need to have n > 4t (resp., n > 3t).
We can view secure function computation as a one-round interaction with a trusted mediator: each agent sends its input to the mediator, the mediator waits until it receives enough inputs, applies f to these inputs (again, replacing missing inputs with a default value), and sends the output back to the agents, who then output it. We generalize BCG and BKR's results for function computation to a more general setting. Specifically, we want to simulate arbitrary interactions with a mediator, not just function computation. Also, unlike previous approaches, we want the simulation to be "bidirectional": the set of possible output distributions that arise with the mediator must be the same as those that arise without the mediator, even in the presence of malicious parties. More precisely, we show that, given a protocol π for n agents and a protocol π d for a mediator, we can construct a protocol π ′ such that for all sets T of fewer than n/4 malicious agents, the following properties hold:
(a) For all protocols τ ′ T for the malicious agents and all schedulers σ ′ e in the setting without the mediator, there exists a protocol τ T for the agents in T and a scheduler σ e in the setting with the mediator such that, for all input profiles x, the output distribution in the computation with π ′ , τ ′ , and σ ′ e with input x is the same as the output distribution with π + π d , τ , and σ e with input x.
(b) For all protocols τ T for the malicious agents and all schedulers σ e in the setting with the mediator, there exists a protocol τ ′ T for the agents in T and a scheduler σ ′ e in the setting without a mediator such that, for all input profiles x, the output distribution in the computation with π ′ , τ ′ , and σ ′ e with input x is the same as the output distribution with π + π d , τ , and σ e with input x.
This result implies that arbitrary distributed protocols that work in the presence of a trusted mediator can be compiled to protocols that work without a mediator, as long as there are less than n/4 malicious agents. And, just as BKR, if we allow a probability ǫ of error, we can get this result while tolerating up to n/3 malicious agents. BCG proved the analogue of (a) for secure function computation, which is enough for security purposes: if there is any bad behavior in the protocol without the mediator, this bad behavior must already exist in the protocol with the mediator. However, (b) also seems like a natural requirement; if a protocol satisfies this property, then all behaviors in the protocol with the mediator also occur in the protocol without the mediator.
Clearly, the results of BCG and BKR are special cases of our result. However, in general, our results do not follow from those of BCG/BKR, as is shown in Section 3.3. Specifically, the results of BCG/BKR do not give us property (b), since the outcome can depend on the behavior of the scheduler. For example, consider a protocol for two agents and a mediator m in which each agent sends its input to the mediator, the mediator m sends to each agent the first message it receives, and each agent outputs whatever they receive from the mediator. Let σ i e be the scheduler that delivers the message from agent i first, for i = 1, 2. It is easy to check that if the agents have inputs 0 and 1, respectively, and play with mediator σ 1 e , then they both output 0, while if they play with σ 2 e , then they both output 1. This means that, unlike secure function computation, even if all the agents are honest, the distribution over the agents' outputs can depend on the scheduler's protocol, not just the agents' inputs.
Even though our results do not follow from those of BCG/BKR, our proofs very much follow the lines of those of BCG/BKR. However, there are some new subtleties that arise in our setting. In particular, as the example above shows, when we try to implement the setting with the mediator, the agents must somehow keep track of the scheduler's possible behaviors. Doing this adds nontrivial complexity to our argument.
Besides the main result, we also show that our protocol without the mediator has two additional security properties, which may be of independent interest. Specifically, we show that the following two properties hold for coalitions of malicious agents of size at most t < n/3.
(P1) The only way malicious agents can disrupt the computation is by preventing honest agents from terminating; if an honest agent terminates, then its output is correct.
(P2) If 2t + 1 or more honest agents terminate, then all honest agents terminate. That is, either all the honest agents terminate or a nontrivial number of honest agents (more than n − 2t) do not terminate.
If we allow an ǫ probability of error, we get analogous results if we have n > 2t rather than n > 3t. We remark that these two properties are in fact also satisfied by BCG's and BKR's implementations, but they do not prove this (or even state the properties explicitly).
Our interest in these properties stems in part from a game-theoretic variant of the problem that we consider a companion paper [Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern 2019] where agents get utility for various outcomes, and, in addition to honest and malicious agents, there are rational agents, who will deviate from a protocol if (and only if) it is to their benefit to do so. We also assume that honest agents can leave "wills", so that if sufficiently many honest agents do not terminate, the remaining agents will be punished. The second property above guarantees that either all the honest agents terminate, or sufficiently many of them do not terminate to guarantee that rational agents will not try to prevent honest agents from terminating (due to the threat of punishment). The first property above guarantees that if all the honest agents terminate, their output will be correct. Thus, using these results allows us to obtain results stronger than those of this paper in the game-theoretic setting.
The focus of this paper is on upper bounds. Since our algorithms have the same upper bounds as those of BCG and BKR, despite the results of BCG and BKR being special cases of our results, and BCG and BKR prove lower bounds that match their upper bonds on the number of malicious agents that can be tolerated, we immediately get lower bounds that match our upper bounds from the results of BCG and BKR.
The Model
The model used throughout this paper is that of an asynchronous network in which every pair of agents can communicate through a private and reliable communication channel. For most of our results, we assume that all messages sent through any of these channels are eventually received, but they can be delayed arbitrarily. The order in which these messages are received is determined by the environment (also called the scheduler ). The scheduler also chooses the order in which the agents are scheduled. For some of the results of this paper, we drop the condition that all messages must be eventually delivered. We call these more general schedulers relaxed schedulers.
Whenever a agent is scheduled, it reads all the messages that it has received since the last time it was scheduled, sends a (possibly empty) sequence of messages, and then performs some internal actions. We assume that the scheduler does not deliver any message or schedule other agents during an agent's turn. Thus, although agent i does not send all its messages simultaneously when it is scheduled, they are sent atomically, in the sense that no other agent is scheduled while i is scheduled, nor are any messages delivered while i is scheduled. Note that the atomicity assumption is really a constraint on the scheduler's protocol.
More precisely, consider the following types of events:
• sch(i): Agent i gets scheduled.
• snd (µ, j, i): Agent i sends a message µ to agent j.
• rec(µ, j, i): Message µ sent by j is received by i. The message µ must be one sent at an earlier time to i that was not already received.
• comp (v, i) : Agent i locally computes value v.
• out(s, i): Agent i outputs string s.
• done(i): i is done sending messages and performing computations (for now).
For simplicity, we assume that agents can output only strings in {0, 1} * . Note that all countable sets can be encoded by such strings, and thus we can freely talk about players being able to output any element of any countable set (for instance, elements of a finite field F q ) by assuming that they are actually outputting an encoding of these elements. We also assume that at most one event occurs at each time step. Let h(m) denote a global history up to time m: a sequence that starts with an input profile x, followed by the ordered sequence of events that have occurred up to and including time m. We assume that the only events between events of the form sch(i) and done(i) are ones of the form snd (µ, j, i) and comp (v, i) . This captures our atomicity assumption. We do not include explicit events that correspond to reading messages. (Nothing would change if we included them; they would simply clutter the notation.) Message delivery (which is assumed to be under the control of the scheduler) occurs at times between when agents are scheduled. We can also consider the subsequence involving agent i, namely, i's initial state, followed by events of the form
and done(i). This subsequence is called i's local history.
We drop the argument m if can be deduced from context or if it is not relevant (for instance, when we consider the local history of an agent after a particular event).
Agent i moves only after a sch(i) event. What it does (in particular, the order in which i sends messages) is determined by i's protocol, which is a function of i's local history. The scheduler moves after an action of the form done(i) or rec (·, ·, i) . It is convenient to assume that the scheduler is also running a protocol, which is also a function of its local history. Since the scheduler does not see the contents of messages, we can take its history to be identical to h(m), except that the messages are removed, although we do track the index of the messages delivered; that is, we replace events of the form snd (µ, i, j) and rec(µ, i, j) by snd (i, j) and rec (i, j, ℓ) , where ℓ is the index of the message sent by i to j in h(m). For instance, rec(i, j, 2) means that the second message sent by i to j was delivered to j. Note that the scheduler does see events of the form done(i); indeed, these are signals to the scheduler that it can move, since i's turn is over. Since we view the agents (and the mediator) as sending messages atomically, in the sequel, we talk about an agent's (or the mediator's) turn. An agent's kth turn takes place the kth time it is scheduled. During its turn, the agent sends a block of messages and performs some local computation.
It is more standard in the literature to assume that agents perform at most one action when they are scheduled. We can view this a constraint on agents' protocols. A single-action protocol for agent i is one where agent i sends at most one message before performing the done(i) action. As we show in Section 3.7, we could have restricted to single-action protocols with no loss of generality as far as our results go; allowing agents to perform a sequence of actions atomically just makes the exposition easier.
Even though it might appear that malicious agents and the scheduler act independently, we show in our companion paper [Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern 2019, Section A. 1] that we can assume without loss of generality that they coordinate their actions (i.e., that they are all under the control of a single entity, which we take here to be the scheduler).
Definition 1. An adversary is a triple (T, σ T , σ e ), consisting of a set T of malicious agents, the protocol τ T used by the agents in T , and a protocol σ e for the scheduler. An adversary where the scheduler is relaxed is a relaxed adversary.
In this paper, we consider protocols that involve a mediator, typically denoted d, using a protocol denoted π d . In protocols that involve a mediator, we assume that honest agents' strategies are always such that the honest agents communicate only with the mediator, not with each other. However, since malicious agents can deviate, they can communicate with each other. As far as the scheduler is concerned, the mediator is like any other agent, so the scheduler (and the mediator's protocol) determine when the mediator sends and receives messages. However, the mediator is never malicious, and thus never deviates from its announced protocol.
We deal only with bounded protocols, where there is a bound N on the number of messages that an honest agent sends. Of course, there is nothing to prevent malicious agents from spamming the mediator and sending an arbitrary number of messages. We assume that the mediator reads at most N messages from each agent i, ignoring any further messages sent by i.
For our results involving termination, specifically, (P2), it is critical that players know when the mediator stops sending messages. For these results, we restrict the honest agents and the mediator to using protocols that have the following canonical form: Using a canonical protocol, each honest agent tags its ℓth message with label ℓ and all honest agents are guaranteed to send at most N messages regardless of their inputs or the random bits they use. Whenever the mediator receives a message from an agent i, it checks its tag ℓ; if ℓ > N or if the mediator has already received a message from i with tag ℓ, it ignores the message. The mediator is guaranteed to eventually terminate. Whenever this happens, it sends a special "STOP" message to all agents and halts. Whenever an honest agent receives a "STOP" message, it terminates.
Even though canonical protocols have a bound N on the number of messages that honest agents and the mediator can send, the mediator's local history in a canonical protocol can be arbitrarily long, since it can be scheduled an arbitrary number of times. We conjecture that, in general, since the message space is finite, the expected number of messages required to simulate the mediator is unbounded. However, we can do better if the mediator's protocol satisfies two additional properties. Roughly speaking, the first property says that the mediator can send messages only either at its first turn or in response to an agent's message; the second property says that the mediator ignores empty turns, that is, turns where it does not receive or send messages. Thus, the second property implies that the mediator cannot send a message after receiving a message that describes how many empty turns there have been since the last time the mediator sent a message. More precisely, the first property says that whenever the mediator π d is scheduled with history h d , then if h d = ( ) (i.e., if h d is not the initial history) or if the mediator has not received any messages in h d since the last time it was scheduled, then
). In Section 4.4, we show that if the mediator uses a responsive protocol π d that can be represented using a curcuit with c gates, then we can simulate any protocol π + π d in such a way that the expected number of messages sent by honest players during the simulation is polynomial in n and N and linear in c.
Secure Computation in Interactive Settings

The BGW/BCG notion of secure computation
Secure computation is concerned with jointly computing a function f on n variables, where the ith input is known only to agent i. For instance, if we want to compute the average salary of the people from the state of New York, then n would be New York's population, the input x i is i's salary, and
(For the denominator we count only people who are actually working.) Ideally, a secure computation protocol that computes f would be a protocol in which each agent i outputs f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and gains no information about the inputs x j for j = i. In our example, this amounts to not learning other people's salaries.
Typically, we are interested in performing secure computation in a setting where some of the agents might be malicious and not follow the protocol. In particular, they might not give any information about their input or might just pretend that they have a different input (for instance, they can lie about their salary). What output do we want the secure computation of f to produce in this case?
To make precise what we want, we use notation introduced by BGW and BCG. Let x be a vector of n components; let C be a subset of [n] (where we use the notation [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}, as is standard); let x C denote the vector obtained by projecting x onto the indices of C; and if z is a vector of length |C|, let x/ (C, z) denote the vector obtained by replacing the entries of x indexed by C with z. Given a set C of indices, a default value, which we take here to be 0, and a function f , we take f C to be the function results from applying f , but taking the inputs of the agents not in C to be 0; that is, f C ( x) = f ( x/ (C, 0) ). Roughly speaking, if only the agents in C provide inputs, we want the output of the secure computation to be f c ( x).
What about agents who lie about their inputs? A malicious agent i who lies about his input x i and pretends to have some other input y i is indistinguishable from an honest agent who has y i as his actual input. We can capture this lie using a function L : D |T | → D |T | , where D is the domain of the inputs and T is the set of malicious agents. The function L encodes the inputs malicious agents pretend to have given their actual inputs. BCG require that all the honest agent output the same value and that the output has the form (C, f C ( y)), where y = x/ (T,L( x T )) . They allow C to depend on x T , since malicious agents can influence the choice of C. They also allow the choice of C and the function L to be randomized. Since the choice of L and C can be correlated, L and C are assumed to take as input a common random value r ∈ R, where R denotes the domain of random inputs. That is, C = c( x T , r) for some function c, and the malicious agents with actual input x T pretend that their input is L( x T , r).
BCG place no requirements on the output of malicious agents, but they do want the inputs of honest agents to remain as secret as possible. Hence, in an ideal scenario, the outputs of malicious agents can depend only on x T , f C ( y), and possibly some randomization. Taking O i to denote the output function of a malicious agent i, we can now give BCG's definitions. 
Let ρ( x, A; f ) denote the distribution induced over outputs by the protocol profile ρ on input x given the ideal t-adversary A. Note that an ideal t-adversary is somewhat different from the adversary as defined in Definition 1, although they are related, as we show in Section 3.3. We use variants of A to denote both types of adversary.
We can now give the BCG definition of secure computation. Let π( x, A) be the distribution of outputs when running protocol π on input x with adversary A = (T, τ T , σ e ).
Definition 3 (Secure computation). Let f : D n → D be a function on n variables and π a protocol for n agents. Protocol π t-securely computes f if, for every adversary A ′ = (T, τ T , σ e ), the following properties hold:
SC1. For all input profiles x, all honest agents terminate with probability 1.
SC2. There exists an ideal t-adversary
Note that BCG just require that some ideal t-adversary A gives the same distribution over the the outputs of π. This captures the idea that all ways that malicious agents can deviate are modeled by adversaries. Also note that SC1 follows from SC2 if we view non-termination as a special kind of output.
BCG prove the following result:
Theorem 1. Given n and t such that n > 4t and a function f : D n → D, there exists a protocol π f that t-securely computes f .
The construction of π f , which is sketched in the next section, is of critical importance for this paper, since most of the primitives used in this construction are also used in ours.
The BCG construction
To explain the BCG construction, we must first review the tools used by BCG, specifically, broadcast, consensus, verifiable secret sharing (VSS), circuit computation, accumulative sets, agreement on a core set, and random polynomial generation. (Accumulative sets and agreement on a core set were introduced by BCG; the other tools are older.)
Broadcast
A broadcast protocol involves a sender who sends a message µ to all agents in such a way that all honest agents receive the same message. (Although we talk about "a broadcast protocol", this is really a joint protocol, that is, a protocol for each agent. Given a joint protocol P , we use P i to denote i's part of the protocol. The sender's protocol is different from those of the other agents. The sender has input µ, the message to be shared; the other agents have no input.) Moreover, if the sender is honest, the message received by an agent i must be the message µ that the sender sent. More precisely, a broadcast protocol invoked by a sender with input µ must satisfy the following properties in all histories:
• If an honest agent terminates broadcast with output µ ′ , then all honest agents eventually terminate broadcast with output µ ′ .
• If the sender is honest, then all honest agents eventually terminate broadcast and output µ.
Bracha [1984] provides a broadcast protocol that tolerates up to t malicious agents in asynchronous systems if n > 3t.
Consensus
In a consensus protocol, each agent i starts with an initial preference y i ∈ {0, 1} and must output a value x ∈ {0, 1} such that the following properties are satisfied in all histories:
• All honest agents terminate with probability 1.
• If one honest agent terminates and outputs x, then all honest agents terminate and output x.
• If all honest agents have the same initial value y, then if an honest agent i terminates the protocol, i outputs y.
Abraham, Dolev and Halpern [2008] provide a consensus protocol that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems if n > 3t.
Verifiable secret sharing
In a verifiable secret sharing protocol, a sender starts out with some secret s that it wants to share. VSS consists of a pair of protocols ( − − → VSS sh , − − → VSS rec ), commonly referred to as the sharing protocol and the reconstruction protocol, and a designated agent, the sender, such that the following properties hold:
• If the sender is honest, then every honest agent i will eventually complete VSS sh i .
• If an honest agent i completes VSS • The output of VSS with input i's share of the secret, then all the honest agents j will complete VSS rec j , and will output the same value s ′ , no matter what the malicious agents do.
• If the sender is honest, then s ′ = s (the sender's secret).
• If the sender is honest and no honest agent i has begun executing VSS rec i , then the malicious agents cannot guess s with probability > 1/M (where M is the cardinality of the space of possible secrets).
With VSS, just as with the broadcast protocol, the sender's protocol is different from that of the other agents; only the sender has the secret s. Whenever a recipient i receives a message µ from the sender, it invokes VSS sh i with input µ and outputs its share of the secret, which becomes the input to VSS rec i . Even though we require each agent i to output the same value s ′ after runing VSS rec i , a simple modification of − − → VSS rec allows a single agent to learn the secret, without any other agent getting any additional information: If we want only i to learn the secret, all the agents send their shares to i, and i simulates the computation of − − → VSS rec locally. (This depends on the assumption that the only input to VSS rec j is j's share of the secret, and that it suffices for i to learn the shares of the honest agents in order to recover the secret.) However, no other agents learn anything about the secret (since all they have is their share of the secret).
BCG provide a VSS protocol in an asynchronous setting that is t resilient as long as n > 4t. BKR showed that if n > 3t, then for all ǫ > 0, there exists a t-resilient protocol that achieves the VSS properties in asynchronous systems with probability at least 1 − ǫ. More precisely, their protocol has the property that if some honest agent terminates, then all honest agents terminate and all the properties above hold, and some honest agent terminates with probability at least 1 − ǫ.
Accumulative sets
Suppose that we have a global clock, initialized to 0. We do not assume that agents have access to the global clock. An accumulative set is a function U (h, m) from histories and global time to sets such that
• for all agents j that are honest in h, there exists a time m h i,j such that
To see how (M 1 , M 2 )-uniform accumulative sets are used, suppose that each agent i in a system of n agents has a secret s i . The n agents each invoke t-resilient VSS concurrently in a system with t malicious agents and n > 3t, with agent i acting as the sender with secret s i in its invocation of VSS. Let U i (h, m) consist of those agents j for which i has terminated the sharing phase of the VSS initiated by j by time m in history h. Clearly U i is an accumulative set. We claim that (
. . , n} for all times m by construction. Since there at most t malicious agents in each history and the VSS scheme is t-resilient, the properties of VSS guarantee that each honest agent i will eventually complete the VSS initiated by each honest agent j, which means j is included in U i (h, m) for some m, and thus there must exist a time
Agreement on a core set
An agreement on a core set (ACS) protocol is given as input natural numbers M 1 and M 2 . Each agent i is also assumed to have access to an accumulative set U i . If the tuple (U 1 , . . . , U n ) is (M 1 , M 2 )-uniform with respect to the histories of the ACS protocol, then the following properties must hold:
• All honest agents must eventually complete the ACS protocol.
• If an honest agent i completes the protocol at time m, then it output a set
• If i and j are honest, then
Thus, all honest agents running an ACS protocol must output the same set; this set is called the core set. We denote by ACS i (U i , M 1 , M 2 ) agent i's invocation of the ACS protocol with inputs M 1 and M 2 relative to accumulative set U i . Note that although the notation suggests that U i is the input to ACS i , the protocol may actually check U i several times while it is running, and U i may be different each time it is checked, since U i may updated in parallel with ACS i .
BCG provide an ACS protocol that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems if n > 3t.
Circuit computation
Another key primitive that we use is circuit computation. Let ( − − → VSS sh , − − → VSS rec ) be a VSS scheme, and let f : F N p → F p be a circuit with N inputs consisting only of addition and multiplication gates. Suppose that each agent i has shares x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i N of secrets x 1 , . . . , x N ∈ F p respectively (where the secrets are computed using (
, denoted CC(f ) (we suppress the dependence on ( − − → VSS sh , − − → VSS rec ) from now on) has the following properties. We assume that there is an input x 1 , . . . , x N such that each agent i has shares
and computes a single output y i , such that the following properties hold:
• After running CC j (f ) with inputs x j 1 , . . . , x j N (but before running the reconstruction protocol − − → VSS rec ), no malicious agent j has any information about the shares x i l of an honest agent i, the values x 1 , . . . , x N , or f (X 1 , . . . , x N ) beyond what it had before running CC j (f ), even if all the malicious agents pool their information.
• Even after honest agents run − − → VSS rec , no malicious agent j can guess the values of the shares x i l of an honest agents i or the the secrets x 1 , . . . , x N any better than it could before running CC j (f ) if it were given f (x 1 , . . . , x N ).
Simply put, a circuit computation protocol CC allows agents to compute their share of the output of an arithmetic circuit given their shares of the circuit's inputs, without revealing any information.
Since it is well known that every function f : D N → D can be represented by a circuit f ′ : F N p → F p for a prime p ≥ |D| (viewing the elements of D as the first |D| elements of F p ), if we can define a protocol CC(f ) for all arithmetic circuits, then we can define a protocol CC(f ) for all functions f : D N → D. This is especially important in the next section, where we use CC to compute functions whose inputs and outputs are local histories.
BCG provide an implementation of CC(f ) for all arithmetic circuits f relative to the VSS protocol that they provide that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems as long as n > 4t; given ǫ > 0, BKR provide an implementation of CC(f ) for all arithmetic circuits relative to the VSS protocol that they provide that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems and has at most an ǫ probability of error (i.e., there is a probability ǫ that agents remain in deadlock or the output of the computation will not be the appropriate share of the circuit's output) as long as n > 3t.
We can assume without loss of generality that CC can handle randomized functions. That is, if there is a protocol CC(f ) to securely compute every deterministic function f : D N → D, then there is a protocol CC(f ) to securely compute every randomized function f : D N → D. A randomized function f : D N → D can be viewed as a deterministic function once it is given sufficiently many random bits, that is, it can be identified with a deterministic function f : D N × {0, 1} N ′ → D for N ′ sufficiently large. Using ACS, VSS, and (deterministic) CC, the agents can easily compute shares for N ′ random bits as follows.
1. Each agent i chooses a random bit b i and shares it using VSS.
2. Using ACS, the agents agree on a common set C consisting of at least t + 1 agents who correctly shared a bit b i at step 1. Set b := ⊕ i∈C b i (where ⊕ denotes sum mod 2).
3. Each agent i computes its share of b using CC.
If n > 2t, then there are at least t + 1 honest agents, so each honest agent will get shares from at least t + 1 agents. Since the set of t + 1 agents agreed on using ACS contains at least one honest agent, the bit b must be truly random.
We can also assume without loss of generality that whenever an honest agent terminates a CC computation of some function f (x 1 , . . . , x N ), even in the presence of at most t malicious agents, at least n − 2t other honest agents i have computed their share y i of f (x 1 , . . . , x N ). This can be ensured by having an honest agent i send a Ready message to all agents when it finishes the conputation of y i , and terminating the CC procedure when it receives n − t Ready messages. If there are at most t malicious agents, if an agent receives n − t Ready messages, at least n − 2t are from honest agents who genuinely computed their own share. This property will be critical later, since it guarantees that sufficiently many honest agents are running the protocol at roughly the same pace.
Construction of π f
Using the primitives sketched above, BCG gave a construction of π f . At the high level, the construction proceeds as follows: for π f :
1. Each agent i shares its input using VSS.
2. Agents agree on a core set C ⊆ [n] with |C| ≥ n − t using an ACS procedure with parameters M 1 = n − t and M 2 = n, where the accumulative set U i of agent i is the set of agents j such that i has terminated the VSS invoked by j at step 1.
3. Each agent i computes its share of f C ( x) using CC, where i's input for the jth input gate is i's share of x j if j ∈ C; otherwise it is 0.
4. Each agent i sends its share of f C ( x) to each other agent j, then uses the shares received from other agents to reconstruct f C ( x) using VSS.
5. Each agent i outputs (C, f C ( x)).
Secure computation and mediators
Even though it is not explicitly proven by BCG, their construction of π f satisfies an additional property that we call SC3, which is essentially a converse of SC2.
SC3. For all ideal t-adversaries A = (T, c, L, O), there exists an adversary
that, for all input profiles x, ρ( x, A; f ) and π( x, A ′ ) are identically distributed.
Proof. Suppose that A is deterministic (i.e., c, L, and O do not depend on the random string r). Given x T , let C = c( x T ) and y = L( x T ) (note that we have dropped the r input to both functions since both are independent of r). Consider the protocol τ T such that, if the agents in T have input x T , τ i consists of i running π i with input y i , where y T = L( x T ), except that if i was supposed to output (S, z) (note that all outputs of honest agents are of this form, since the ideal output has this form, and π f securely computes f ) it outputs O i ( x T , z) instead. Suppose that the scheduler delays messages to and from players inC until all others players terminate, and that it delivers messages in such a way that all players in C terminate all instances of VSS invoked by a player in C before they receive any other messages. The properties of the ACS protocol guarantee that, in this case, the core set computed by honest players will be C. It follows from the construction of τ T that ρ( x, A) and π( x, T, τ T , σ e ) are identically distributed. If A is randomized, τ T works the same way except that it chooses C, y T , and O T by sampling from the same distribution that r is sampled from.
We next show how secure computation relates to simulating a mediator. Consider the following protocol τ f + τ f d for n players and a mediator: Agents send their inputs to the mediator the first time that they are scheduled. The mediator waits until it has received a valid input from all agents in a subset C of agents with |C| ≥ n − t. The mediator then computes y = f C ( x) and sends each agent the pair (C, y). When the agents receive a message from the mediator, they output that message and terminate.
Clearly τ f + τ f d satisfies SC1. It is easy to see that it also satisfies SC2: Given a set T of malicious agents, a deterministic protocol profile τ T for the malicious agents, and a deterministic scheduler σ e , define L( x, r) to be whatever the malicious agents send to the mediator with input x, let c( x) be the set of agents from whom the mediator has received a message the first time it is scheduled after having received a message from a least n − t agents (given σ e , τ T , and input x), and let O( x) be the output function that malicious agents use in τ f + τ f d (note that they receive a single message with the output of the computation, so their output depends only on x, τ T , and σ e ). Clearly SC2 holds with this choice of t-ideal adversary. Randomized functions τ T and σ e can be viewed as resulting from sampling random bits r according to some distribution and then running deterministically; the protocols c, h, and O can sample r from the same distribution and then proceed as above with respect to the deterministic τ T (r) and σ e (r).
, the definition of τ T and σ e is straightforward: the agents in T choose a random input r ∈ R and then each agent i ∈ T sends L(x i , r) to the mediator. The scheduler σ e delivers all messages from the agents in c( x T , r) first, and then schedules the mediator. It then delivers all the other messages.
Since both τ f + τ f d and π f satisfy SC2 and SC3, for all adversaries A, there exists an adversary A ′ (resp., for all adversaries A ′ there exists an adversary A) such that (
Unfortunately, given a protocol π d for the mediator, there might not exist a function f such that SC2 and SC3 hold, as the example given in the introduction (where the mediator sends to the agents the first message it receives) shows. Note that, in this example, the output of the agents is not a function of their input profile, there is no function f for which SC2 and SC3 hold. Nevertheless, we are still interested in securely computing the output of the protocol with the mediator. That is, we are interested in getting analogues to SC2 and SC3 for arbitrary interactive protocols.
Definition 5. Protocol π ′ t-bisimulates π if the following two properties hold:
(a) For all adversaries A = (T, τ T , σ e ) with |T | ≤ t, there exists an adversary A ′ = (T, τ ′ T , σ ′ e ) such that for all input profiles x, π( x, A) and π ′ ( x, A ′ ) are identically distributed.
Note that the first clause is analogous to SC2, while the second clause is analogous to SC3. There is no clause analogous to SC1 since we allow agents not to terminate. In any case, since we can view non-termination as a special type of output (i.e., we can view an agent that does not terminate as outputting ⊥), so SC2 already guarantees that non-termination happens with the same probability in π ′ and π (In the setting of BGW, since all functions terminate, with this viewpoint, SC2 implies SC1, a point already made by Canetti [1996] .)
Our earlier discussion proves the following proposition:
Beyond secure computation
We view t-bisumulation as capturing the essence of secure computation, as defined by BCG (and others). However, there are two additional properties that we need for the results of our companion paper [Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern 2019] , which we believe are of independent interest. Both of them are in fact satisfied by π f , although BCG do not discuss them.
To understand the first property, note that Proposition 1 guarantees that π f t-bisimulates τ f + τ f d if n > 4t. What happens if t is larger than this threshold? Although BCG make claims for their protocol only if n > 4t, variants of some of the properties that they are interested in continue to hold even if n/4 ≤ t < n/3. Specifically, for each adversary A = (T, τ T , σ e ) , there exists a relaxed adversary
This means that if n > 3t, then the only way that the adversary can affect π f is by preventing some agents from terminating. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 6. A protocol π ′ (t, t ′ )-bisimulates π if it t-bisimulates π but the schedulers σ ′ e and σ e of the first and second clause of Definition 5 respectively may be relaxed for t ≥ |T | > t ′ .
As we just observed, if 4t ≤ n < 3t, then some honest agents might not terminate. However, we can show that the BCG protocol has the property that if at least 2t + 1 honest agents terminate, then all the remaining honest agents terminate. This observation motivates the following definition:
with |T | ≤ t and all input profiles x, in all histories of π with adversary A and input x, either all the agents not in T terminate or strictly fewer than k agents not in T do.
We do not prove Proposition 2 or 3 here, since we prove a generalization of them below (see Theorem 2).
Simulating arbitrary protocols
The goal of this paper is to show that we can securely implement any interaction with a mediator, and do so in a way that ensure the two properties discussed in Section 3.4. This is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. For every protocol π + π d for n agents and a mediator, there exists a protocol The construction of π ′ is given in Section 4.2 and, not surprisingly, uses many of the techniques used by BCG. And, like BKR, if we allow an ǫ probability of error we get stronger results. We define ǫ-t-bisimulation just like t-bisimulation (Definition 5), except that, in both clauses, the distance between ( π + π d )( x, A) and π ′ ( x, A ′ ) is less than ǫ, where the distance d between probability measures ν and ν ′ on some finite space S is defined as d(ν, ν ′ ) = s∈S |ν(s) − ν ′ (s)|. The definition of ǫ-t-bisimulation and ǫ-(t, t ′ )-bisimulation are analogous. A protocol ǫ-(t, k)-coterminates if it (t, k)-coterminates with probability 1 − ǫ.
Theorem 3. For every protocol π + π d for n agents and a mediator and all ǫ > 0, there exists a protocol
Moreover, if π d is responsive, π ′ can be implemented in such a way that the expected number of messages when running π ′ + π d is polynomial in n and N , and linear in c, where N is the expected number of messages sent when running π + π d .
Adversaries in asynchronous systems
Even though throughout this paper we consider the scheduler and malicious players to be separate adversarial entities, we show next that they can coordinate. In particular, we show that malicious players and the scheduler can communicate even though the scheduler cannot send or receive messages.
To see that a malicious player can send information to the scheduler, it suffices to note that a player can encode any unary string 1 k by 5for instance, use the following scheme: Whenever a malicious player sending k messages to itself. Since the scheduler knows the number of messages sent by each player and the recipient of each message, it can "receive" such messages. patterns. The scheduler can communicate with the malicious players by using the following scheme: Whenever a malicious player i is scheduled, it just sends a message to itself and performs a done action. The scheduler then delivers the message to i and schedules i again. This process is repeated until i is scheduled before receiving the message it sent to itself. Agent i can interpret the number k of times that this process is repeated as the unary string 1 k .
Since the scheduler and the malicious players can coordinate by communicating in this fashion, this shows that without loss of generality we can view the adversary as a single entity that controls both the malicious parties and the scheduler simultaneously. We will assume such an adversary in the rest of the paper.
Other models
Before proving our main results, we discuss some of the choices made in our formal model and show that they are essentially being made without loss of generality. We start by considering our assumption that agents perform a sequence of actions atomically when they are scheduled. We next show that we would get theorems equivalent to the ones that we are claiming if we had instead assumed that agents perform just a single action when they are scheduled. To prove this, we first need the following notion: (a) For all schedulers (resp., relaxed schedulers) σ e there exists a scheduler (resp., relaxed scheduler) σ ′ e such that, for all input profiles x, π( x, σ e ) and H( π)( x, σ ′ e ) are identically distributed, where we take H( π) = (H(π 1 ), . . . , H(π n )) and we view σ e and σ ′ e , respectively, as the adversaries (i.e., we take T = ∅).
(b) For all schedulers (resp., relaxed schedulers) σ ′ e there exists a scheduler (resp., relaxed scheduler) σ e such that, for all input profiles x, π( x, σ e ) and H( π)( x, σ ′ e ) are identically distributed.
The converse of Proposition 4 is trivial, since single-action strategies are strategies.
It follows from Proposition 4 that Theorem 2 holds even if we restrict agents to using single-action strategies.
Proof. Intuitively, H(π i ) is identical to π i , except that rather than sending a sequence of messages when it is scheduled, i sends the messages one at a time. The scheduler σ ′ e is then chosen to ensure that i is scheduled so that it sends all of its messages as if they were sent atomically. In addition to keeping track of the messages it has sent and received, i uses the variable U i whose value is a sequence of mesages (intuitively, the ones that i would have sent at this point in the simulation of π i that it has not yet sent), initally set to the empty sequence, and a binary variable next, originally set to 1. When i is scheduled by σ ′ e , H(π i ) proceeds as follows: If next = 1, then i sets U i to the sequence of messages that it would send with π i given its current history. (If π i randomizes, then H(π i ) does the same randomization. If U i is the empty sequence (so π i would not send any messages at that point), i performs the action done(i), and outputs whatever it does with π; otherwise, i sets next to 0, sends the first message in U i to its intended recipient, and removes this message from U i . If next = 0, then if U i is empty, i sets next to 1, sends done(i), and outputs whatever it does with π; otherwise, i sends the first message in U i to its intended recipient and removes it from U i .
Since π is message bounded, there exists an N such that π is N -message bounded. For part (a), given σ e , we construct σ ′ e so that it simulates σ e , except that if σ e schedules i, σ ′ e schedules i repeatedly until either it observes done(i) or until i sends messages in N + 1 consecutive turns. Since π is N -message bounded, it is clear that π( x, σ e ) and H( π)( x, σ ′ e ) are identically distributed. Note that it is necessary for π to be N -message bounded, since if the scheduler schedules each player i repeatedly until it stops sending a message during its turn, a player that keeps sending messages would be scheduled indefinitely, and so would prevent other players from being scheduled.
For part (b), given σ ′ e , we construct σ e so that it simulates σ e . There is one issue that we have to deal with. Whereas with σ e , an agent i can send k messages each time it is scheduled, with σ ′ e , it can send only one message when it is scheduled. The scheduler σ ′ e constructed from σ e in part (a) scheduled i repeatedly until it sent all the messages it did with σ e . But we cannot assume that the scheduler σ ′ e that we are given for part (b) does this. Thus, σ e must keep track of how many of the messages that each agent i was supposed to send the last time it was scheduled by σ e have been sent so far. To do this, σ e uses variables mes i , one for each agent i, initially set to 0, such that mes i keeps track of how many of the messages that agent i sent with σ e still need to be sent by σ ′ e . As we observed above, given a local history h of the scheduler where the agents use π and the scheduler uses σ e , there is a corresponding local history h ′ of the scheduler where the agents use π ′ and the scheduler uses σ ′ e . If, given h ′ , σ ′ e schedules agent i with probability α i , then with the same probability α i , σ e proceeds as follows: if mes i = 0 (which means that all the messages that i sent the last time it was scheduled have been delivered in h ′ ), then σ e schedules i, sees how many messages i delivers according π i , and sets mes i to this number; if mes i = 0, then mes i is decremented by 1 but no agent is scheduled. Again, it is clear that that π( x, σ e ) and H( π)( x, σ ′ e ) are identically distributed.
BCG put further constraints on the scheduler. Specifically, they assume that, except possibly for the first time that agent i is scheduled, i is scheduled immediately after receiving a message and only then. That is, in our terminology, BCG assume that a rec(·, ·, i) event must be followed by a sch(i) event, and all sch(i) events except possibly the first one occur after a rec(·, ·, i) event. We call the schedulers that satisfy this constraint BCG schedulers.
We now prove a result analogous to Proposition 4, from which it follows that we could have obtained our results using a BCG scheduler. Proof. As in Proposition 4, the idea is that σ ′ e simulates σ e , but since σ e can schedule an agent only when it delivers a message, we have each agent i send itself special messages, denoted proceed i , to ensure that there are always enough messages in the system. In more detail, H(π i ) works as follows. When it is first scheduled, agent i sends itself a proceed i message. Since we are considering BCG schedulers, agent i is scheduled subsequently only when it receives a message. If it receives a message other than proceed i , it does nothing (although the message is added to its history). If it receives a proceed i message, then it does whatever it would do with π i given its current history with the proceed i messages and the sch(i) events not preceeded by a proceed i message removed, and sends itself another proceed i message.
For part (a), given σ e , σ ′ e first schedules each agent once (in some arbitrary order), to ensure that that each of them has sent a proceed i message that is available to be delivered. Given a history h ′ , σ ′ e considers what σ e would do in the history h that results from h ′ by removing the initial sch(i) event for each agent i, the last message that each agent i sends when it is scheduled if it sends a message at all, and the receipt of these messages. If h ′ is a history that results where the agents are running H( π), then the send and receive events removed are precisely those that involve proceed i . If σ e delivers a message with some probability, then σ ′ e delivers the corresponding message with the same probability; if σ e schedules an agent i with some probability, σ ′ e delivers the last proceed i that i sent and schedules agent i with the same probability. If there is no proceed i message to deliver, then σ ′ e does nothing, but our construction of H(π i ) guarantees that if h ′ is a history that results from running H( π), then there will be such a message that can be delivered. Again, it is clear that π( x, σ e ) and H( π)( x, σ ′ e ) are identically distributed.
For part (b), given σ ′ e , the construction of σ e is similar to that of Proposition 4. Again, given a local history h of σ e where the agents use π, there is a corresponding history h ′ of σ ′ e where the agents use H( π). If, given input h ′ , σ ′ e delivers a message with some probability p and the messages is not a proceed i message, then σ e delivers the corresponding message with probability p. If the message is a proceed i message, then σ e also schedules agent i. If σ ′ e schedules an agent i with probability p, and in h ′ this is the first time that i is scheduled, then σ e schedules i with probability p and otherwise does nothing with probability p. Yet again, it is straightforward to show that π( x, σ e ) and H( π)( x, σ ′ e ) are identically distributed.
The Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
In this section, we prove Theorems 2 and 3. Since the proofs are rather complicated, we proceed in stages.
t-uniform VSS and CC and determinate VSS
BCG's implementation of VSS satisfies some additional properties that they do not make use of, but that we will need in our construction, so we outline them here.
Given a sequence I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } of distinct honest agents, a sequence S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of values, and a secret s, we say that (I, S) is s-realizable by a VSS (resp., CC) implementation if, for that implementation, there exists an agent i such that the the event that each agent i k computes s k as the output of i's invocation of VSS with secret s has nonzero probability. In other words, (I, S) is s-realizable if S could be the output of the agents in I running VSS with secret s. (I, S) is realizable if it is s-realizable for some s.
We say that (I ′ , S ′ ) is an s-extension of (I, S) if I is a prefix of I ′ , S is a prefix of S ′ and (I ′ , S ′ ) is s-realizable. (I ′ , S ′ ) is a full s-extension if I ′ is the set of all agents. Again, we say that (I ′ , S ′ ) is an extension of (I, S) if it is an s-extension of (I, S) for some s; it is a full extension if, in addition, I ′ is the set of all agents. We omit the I term in each of these definitions if it is clear from context which agent computed each of the shares in S.
BCG's implementation of VSS and CC guarantees that if s i is the share of an honest agent i after running an invocation of VSS or CC, then there exists a polynomial p of degree t (where t is a bound on the number of malicious agents) such that p(i) = s i and p(0) is the secret shared through VSS or computed through CC. Moreover, this polynomial p is uniformly sampled from the set of all polynomials p ′ of degree t with p ′ (0) = s. With BCG's implementation of VSS and CC, a pair (I, S) is realizable iff there exists a polynomial p of degree t such that p(i k ) = s k for all k.
With this notation, we can state the properties that we need for our VSS and CC implementation. A circuit that computes values in F p can be securely computed by n agents if the inputs are shared using VSS, and the addition and multiplication gates are computed using CC. At the end of the computation, each agent has a share of the output. The first property that we require, to simplify our proof, is that for all sets T of size at most t, the output of such a circuit is uniformly distributed over F |T | p :
Definition 9. An implementation of VSS and CC is t-uniform if, for all circuits C with a single output gate, and all sets I of honest agents with |I| ≤ t, the output of I after securely computing C is uniformly distributed over
We actually seem to need a somewhat stronger property than t-uniformity: conditional t-uniformity (i.e., t-uniformity conditional on the outcome of earlier CC instances). In general, a t-uniform implementation may not satisfy conditional t-uniformity. For example, two empty circuits that take the shares of a single VSS instance as inputs produce identical outputs, which are the the shares of the VSS. Fortunately, it is easy to convert a circuit C to a circuit C ′ that computes the same secret, and also satisfies conditional t-uniformity conditional on all other CC instances.
Suppose for simplicity that C has a single output gate. We construct C ′ by having each agent i invoke a t-uniform VSS with 0 as the secret. Agent i then computes (using CC) the product of the secrets whose shares it receives, and adds it share of the product to the output of C. Clearly the players will get the same value with C and C ′ after they share their shares, no matter what the malicious players do. Also, since C ′ takes as inputs instances of VSS that are not used in any other circuit, the output of a subset I with |I| ≤ t conditional on the output of all other CC instances is uniformly distributed over F |T | p . Thus, if the implementation of VSS and CC is t-uniform, we can assume without loss of generality that we are working with conditionally t-uniform circuits.
We also require that the shares of a set of at least t + 1 honest agents uniquely determine the secret.
Definition 10. An implementation P of VSS and CC is t-determinate if (a) P is t-resilient; (b) P is t-uniform if there are at most t malicious agents; and (c) for all pairs (I, S) with |I| ≥ t + 1, if (I, S) is realizable, then there exists a unique full
extension (I ′ , S ′ ) of (I, S).
BCG's implementation of VSS is t-determinate: it is easy to check that it satisfies clauses (b) and (c) of the definition; BCG prove that it is t-resilient.
For all of our constructions, we assume that the secret-sharing scheme used is t-determinate.
Constructing π
′
Our construction of π ′ is similar in spirit to BCG's constrution of π f . As we said earlier, what makes our setting more complicated is that the agents send multiple messages to the mediator, and the mediator sends multiple messages back. We will need to keep track of which messages are being sent in response to which other messages. Moreover, to get t-bisimulation, we need to be able to simulate all possible behaviors of the scheduler, both with π + π d and with π ′ .
For ease of exposition, we begin by giving a naive construction of π ′ , which, as we later show, does not quite satisfy all the desired properties. However, it gives the intuition for the actual construction (which requires only a small modification of the naive construction). We now sketch the naive construction, then give a detailed description, and then explain the minor modifications needed to correct the problems in the naive construction. This construction may not satisfy the bound we claimed on the expected number of messages when the mediator is responsive. We show in Section 4.4 how to modify the construction so as to satisfy that bound.
When running π ′ i , each agent i simulates its counterpart running π i except that, rather than sending and receiving messages from the mediator, i shares messages it shares and reconstructs messages using VSS. In addition, all agents use CC to compute the mediator's local history given the messages shared by the agents and to compute the messages the mediator sends to the agents according to π d , given its local history. Note that, after running CC, each agent has a share of the mediator's message. If this is a message sent by the mediator to agent i, then each agent sends its share to i, so that i can reconstruct the message.
To do the simulation, each agent i computes two sequences, {h i,k } k∈N and {h i d,k } k∈N . Each element h i,k in the first sequence represents the i's local history the kth time that i is scheduled in the simulated interaction with the mediator, while each term h i d,k of the second sequence represents i's share of the mediator's local history the kth time that the mediator is scheduled in the simulated interaction. Of course, these histories depend (in part) on how i does the simulation. In our naive protocol, we assume that all agents get scheduled in the simulation at times corresponding to when they get scheduled in the computation of π ′ , after getting corresponding messages. That is, whenever i is scheduled in π ′ , it checks all the messages received from the simulated mediator since the last time it was scheduled in π ′ , then simulates itself being scheduled in π + π d after receiving exactly the same messages in the same order as it did in π ′ . This means that h i,k is constructed by appending to h i,k−1 all messages received by i and the results of all local computations of i between the (k − 1)st and kth time that i is scheduled in π ′ . Therefore, in the naive construction, h i,k , which is i's view the kth time that i is scheduled in the simulation of the computation of π + π d , is also part of i's view of the simulation the kth time that i is scheduled in π ′ . That is, if i has been scheduled k times in π ′ , then it is also scheduled exactly k times in the simulation. As we show later by example, this property prevents us from being able to simulate all schedulers in the interaction with the mediator, and is precisely why the naive construction does not quite work. That said, for now we continue to explain the naive construction.
Note that, in π ′ , i does not receive the mediator's actual messages in its simulation; rather, it receives shares of those messages. Agent i appends a message to h i,k−1 only at the point that the message can be reconstructed from the shares of the message that i receives from the other agents. After computing h i,k , i computes which messages it sends according to π i (given the history it has simulated) and, for each such message µ, i shares µ using VSS.
Computing {h i d,k } k∈N is more subtle. We must ensure that all agents agree on what messages should be appended to h d,k to get h d,k+1 ; otherwise, agents will not have a consistent view of the mediator's history. Since, at any point in the execution of π ′ , different agents may have terminated different invocations of VSS, this requires a little care.
. . , h i d,k be the sequence of shares of the mediator's local history in the simulation computed thus far by agent i. We will ensure that, for all k, (h 1 d,k , h 2 d,k , . . . , h n d,k ) are shares of some local history h d,k of the mediator in the computation of π being simulated, where h d,0 is the empty sequence and h d,k is a prefix of h d,k+1 (so that the mediator's history get increasingly longer). After computing their shares of h d,k , agents can perform a circuit computation to compute the messages the mediator sends to the agents given local history h d,k .
We now describe the naive construction of π ′ in more detail.
As we said, because our naive construction assumes that i is scheduled the same number of times in the simulation of π i as in the actual computation of π ′ i , the kth time i is scheduled when running π ′ i , i's history includes simulated histories h i,0 , . . . , h i,k−1 and shares of simulated histories h i d,0 , . . . , h i d,k ′ (note that k ′ might not be equal to k). These simulated histories are the output of local computations, and thus are recorded in the i's history. In addition, i's history keeps track of the status of all the invocations of protocols like VSS and CC in which i participates (including results of random coin tosses, which we also view as the outcome of computation). Note that there might be several invocations of the same protocol that an agent is involved in at the same time; for example, an agent might invoke VSS several times before any of them complete. To remove ambiguity, we assume that all invocations of a protocol are labeled; for example, the first invocation of VSS invoked by agent i could be labeled (VSS, i, 1), the second one could be labeled (VSS, i, 2)), and so on. These labels are communicated to the scheduler using the scheme presented in Section 3.6. Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that the scheduler knows the labels.
If agent i is scheduled when it is in such a state, it first processes all messages received since the last time it was scheduled. (We assume that all messages received since the last time that i was scheduled are held in some buffer.) "Processing a message" µ consists of i playing its part in the protocol to which µ belongs (which we assume is indicated in the label of µ); if µ is a share of a simulated mediator message, i checks if it can reconstruct a new mediator message and, if so, updates h i,k accordingly. After processing all of its new messages, i will have constructed h i,k+1 . Agent i checks what action(s) π i takes given input h i,k+1 . If π i outputs a value v, then so does π ′ i ; if these actions include sending one or more messages to the mediator, then i shares those messages using VSS instead. Finally, if possible, i computes its share of the simulated mediator's local history h i d,k ′ +1 and computes (along with the other agents) which messages the mediator sends to the agents. We now explain how this is done.
, the mediator's initially local history, is empty (and all agents know this). To compute h i d,0 , i simulates a computation of VSS initiated by agent 1 (there is nothing special about agent 1 here; any other agent would do) with input the empty sequence under the assumption that all agents are honest, and takes h i d,0 to be i's share of the output of the computation. Since VSS is a randomized protocol, to assure consistency, all agents must use the same random bits in this computation of VSS; we can assume that these random bits are hardcoded into π ′ . Note that this is equivalent to just hardcoding the values of h i d,0 in π ′ , but viewing h i d,0 as the output of an invocation of VSS will be useful in the future.
Assuming that h i d,k has been computed, we show how to compute h i d,k+1 . The idea is that the agents perform a circuit computation with inputs h i d,k and all the new messages to be appended to h d,k (note that each agent has a share of each of these inputs). It is critical when running a CC invocation that the inputs of each honest agent are consistent with the inputs of all other honest agents participating in the same invocation. More precisely, for all pairs of agents i and j, if i's ℓth input is i's share of the message being shared in some VSS invocation (VSS, i ′ , j ′ ), then j's ℓth input must be j's share of the same message. It is not straightforward to ensure this, since i and j might have completed different invocations of VSS at the time that they update h i d,k and h
respectively.
Since this issue arises in a number of contexts, we formalize this notion of consistency. Suppose that ρ is a joint protocol and h is a history of ρ. Let v be an invocation of CC in h in which some honest agent i has participated. Invocation v is well-defined if the following holds:
(a) All honest agents eventually participate in v.
(b) Suppose that α has m inputs. For each ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m, there exists an invocation v l of VSS or CC that occurred earlier in the computation such that each honest agent i's share of the ℓth input of v is i's share of the output of v ℓ .
All the invocations of CC to compute h i d,k+1 are well-defined in this sense, since players must use the shares of the same secret at each gate of the CC. To ensure this, agents first agree on which subset of messages should be appended to h d,k , then they agree on the order in which these messages should be appended, and finally they append these messages to h d,k and compute the messages sent by the scheduler to the agents, which are also appended to h d,k . The protocol for extending
proceeds in four phases, denoted k1, . . . , k4.
Phase k1: Let N the maximum number of messages that an honest agent sends when running π + π d . Each agent i participates in nN consensus protocols in phase k1, denoted p 1,1,k , . . . , p n,N,k , where p i,j,k is intended to achieve consensus on whether i has shared its jth message successfully. More precisely, i's input to consensus protocol p j,ℓ,k is 1 iff i has terminated j's ℓth invocation of VSS by the time i starts phase k1 and p j,ℓ,k ′ has output 0 for all k ′ < k. Agent i waits until it has terminated all the p j,ℓ,k consensus protocols it is involved with in phase k1 before starting phase k2. If the output of some consensus protocol p j,ℓ,k is 1, then i waits until it has also completed j's ℓth VSS invocation in round k before starting phase k2.
Phase k2: Let p j 1 ,ℓ 1 ,k , p j 2 ,ℓ 2 ,k , . . . , p jm k ,ℓm k ,k be the consensus protocols that were used in phase k1 and had output 1, ordered in lexicographic order (i.e., p j,ℓ,k precedes p j ′ ,ℓ ′ ,k ′ iff j < j ′ or [j = j ′ and ℓ < ℓ ′ ]). In this phase, i coordinates with the other agents on the order that they should append the messages shared in (VSS,
We want the agents to agree on the same permutation of (j 1 , ℓ 1 ), . . . , (j m k , ℓ m k ). To do this, they use BCG's secure computation protocol. Each agent i inputs a permutation to the protocol; the output is the permutation that they coordinate on. Agent i's input to the protocol is the unique permutation
Note that since i completes all the VSS invocations that are in progress in phase k1 before it starts phase k2, i can compute this permutation. The BCG computation returns the (unique) permutation θ satisfying θ(a)
and a < b. Thus, roughly speaking, θ(a) < θ(b) if, on average, agents terminated (V SS, j a , ℓ a ) before (V SS, j b , ℓ b ). Note that because of the asynchrony of the system, we can guarantee only that at most n − t inputs will be available when computing θ. For the remaining inputs σ i we take σ i to be the identity permutation.
Phase k3: Agent i uses CC to append new messages to h i d,k . More precisely, it updates h i d,k with (VSS, j θ(1) , ℓ θ(1) ), ..., (VSS, j θ(m k ) , ℓ θ(m k ) ) in the order determined by the permutation θ computed in phase k2. Note that the properties of VSS and the fact that i completes all outstanding VSS invocations in phase k1 guarantee that all honest agents have a share of all these messages when they start phase k3. This procedure gives agent i a share that we denoteh i d,k+1 of the mediator's updated local historyh d,k+1 after appending these new messages to h d,k in the appropriate order. In phase k4 agents never actually compute (their shares, if any, of) the messages sent by the mediator during its (k + 1)st turn; they compute only the result of appending these message to h d,k . Later we will see how agents compute their shares of each of thesee messages individually, using the fact that it is encoded in h d,k+1 .
This protocol satisfies two important properties if n > 4t: Proof. If the output of some consensus protocol p j,ℓ,k is 1, then the properties of VSS guarantee that at least one honest agent had input 1. Thus, at least one honest agent terminated (VSS, j, ℓ). The properties of VSS guarantee that all other honest agents eventually terminate this VSS invocation as well. The properties of consensus and secure computation guarantee that all agents use the outputs of the same VSS invocations in the same order, which means that the CC procedure of phase k3 is well-defined for all runs.
Lemma 3. If an honest agent shares a message µ using VSS, then µ will be in h d,k for some k, and hence each honest agent i will have a share of µ in h i d,k .
Proof. If (VSS, j, ℓ) is invoked by an honest agent j, then all honest agents are guaranteed to eventually terminate this invocation of VSS. Thus, the output of consensus protocol p j,ℓ,k (at Phase k1) is 1 for exactly one value of k. (Note that if the output of p k,ℓ,k is 1, then all honest players take 0 to be the input for all consensus protocols p j,ℓ,k ′ with k ′ > k. This guarantees that the output of all these protocols is 0.) This ensures that (VSS, j, ℓ) is appended toh d,k+1 in Phase k3, and thus it is included in h d,k+1 .
Since, by the time each agent i finishes computing h i d,k , all the messages that the mediator sends to each agent are already encoded in h d,k , it may seem that to compute the shares of these messages individually, i would have to use an instance of CC for each one.
However, this procedure is not so straightforward since i does not know beforehand how many messages the mediator sends or the order in which the mediator sends messages the kth time it is scheduled (although this is also encoded in h d,k ). To deal with this issue, before computing its share of each of the mediator's messages, i first checks if there is a message that still needs to be sent and, if so, who the recipient is.
More precisely, let f k,ℓ be the function that takes as input a mediator's local history and returns the recipient of the ℓth message sent by the mediator the kth time it is scheduled; similarly, let g k,ℓ be the function that computes the ℓth message sent by the mediator the kth time it is scheduled, given the mediator's history. If the mediator sends fewer than ℓ messages the kth time it is scheduled, or if the input is not a well-defined local history, both f k,ℓ and g k,ℓ return 0. After computing h d,k , agent i proceeds as follows for ℓ = 1, 2, . . .: it performs a circuit computation of f k,ℓ with input h i d,k . Then i broadcasts the output of this computation, and uses the values it receives from other agents to reconstruct
This completes the description of the naive version of π ′ . As we have been hinting, this protocol does not quite work. The following example makes the reasons more precise.
Consider a protocol π + π d in which the mediator sends a STOP message to each agent the first time it (the mediator) is scheduled. If i was scheduled before receiving the STOP message, it outputs 0; otherwise, it outputs 1. Note that any combination of outputs is possible with π + π d , depending on when the scheduler schedules the mediator and the agents. However, this is not true for π ′ as we have defined it. Suppose, for example, that all agents are honest, and i is the first agent scheduled in a history of π ′ . At this point, i is supposed to compute h i,1 . Since it has not received any messages, it will take h i,1 to be empty, and thus output 0. It follows that no history of π ′ can end with all agents outputting 1, which means that π ′ does not t-bisimulate π + π d .
In our construction of the naive version of π ′ , each agent i calculates h k,i the kth time that i is scheduled in π ′ . However, since computing each of h d,1 , h d,2 , . . . takes several turns of i, the mediator's history h d,k ′ being computed by i during its kth turn satisfies that k ′ ≤ k. This means that i is simulating that the mediator, at all times, has taken less turns than i, which may not be true in the protocol with the mediator. As our example shows, some scenarios cannot be simulated with our naive construction because of this. We deal with this problem by using the scheduler in the simulation to determine whether an update to h i,k or h i d,k ′ should occur when i is scheduled.
We proceed as follows. When an agent i is first scheduled, i sends two special messages, proceed i and proceed d,0 , to itself and computes h i,0 (which is just an empty history) and h i d,0 . What i does when it is scheduled for the ℓth time for ℓ > 1 depends on whether it has received messages of the form proceed i and proceed d,r and messages from itself since the last time it was scheduled. Suppose that i has computed the sequences h i,0 , . . . , h i,k and h i d,0 , . . . , h i d,k ′ when it is scheduled for the ℓth time. If i has not received a proceed i message since the last time it was scheduled, i does not compute h i,k+1 . If i has received a proceed i message since the last time it was scheduled, then it sends itself another proceed i message and computes h i,k+1 as described above, using all the messages it received since it was last scheduled and received a proceed i message Thus, i computes the next history in the sequence {h i,k } k∈N if and only if i receives a proceed i message. Similarly, if i has not received a message of the form proceed d,r since the last time it was scheduled, then it does not do any of the steps needed to compute h i d,k ′ +1 . If it has received a message of the form proceed d,r message since the last time it was scheduled, it sends itself a message of the form proceed d,r+1 . (Thus, the second component of the subscript serves a counter for the number of such messages that have been sent.) If k ′ ≤ r, then i plays its part in computing h i d,k ′ +1 . Otherwise, i does not take part in any procedure involved in the computation of h i d,k ′ +1 ; that is, i waits until it receives proceed d,r before attempting to compute h i d,r . Thus, when it is scheduled, i may take part in computing both h i,k+1 and h i d,k ′ +1 , only one of them, or neither of them. Since the scheduler must eventually deliver all messages, all agents receive all the proceed messages that they send themselves, so eventually do update h i,k and h i d,k .
This completes the construction of π ′ . In the next few subsections, we prove that π ′ has the desired properties.
The proof of Theorem 2(a)
We now prove Theorem 2(a). For ease of exposition, we begin by proving this result for the special case that t ′ = t, showing that π ′ t-bisimulates π if n > 4t.
Proof that π ′ t-bisimulates π if n > 4t: We actually prove a result slightly stronger than Theorem 2(a): while the definition of bisimulation allows σ ′ e to depend on both σ e τ ′ T and τ ′ T to depend on both τ T on σ e , in our construction below, σ ′ e depends only on σ e (and not on τ ′ T ), while τ ′ T depends only on τ T (and not on σ e ).
We begin by showing that π ′ satisfies part (a) of the definition of bisimulation assuming that all players are honest. Later, we show how this proof can also be applied to the case in which a subset T of players deviate. Given a scheduler σ e in the mediator setting, we construct a scheduler σ ′ e in the setting without the mediator as follows. Initially, σ ′ e schedules each agent i exactly once. Recall that if i is honest, the first time it is scheduled it sends only proceed i and proceed d,0 messages to itself. The point of scheduling all the agents initially is simply to get these proceed messages into the system. From then, just as the agents do with π ′ , σ ′ e simulates which history h e the scheduler would have in the interaction with the mediator if the mediator and the agents used π + π d and the scheduler used σ e . At the beginning of the game, the scheduler sets h e to the empty history. How the scheduler updates h e and what actions the scheduler performs according to σ ′ e then depend on the form of a = σ e (h e ) (i.e., the actions that σ e would perform given history h e ), and on the actions that the players perform afterwards:
• If a has the form sch(i), then it delivers i's most recent proceed i message if there is one to deliver, and then schedules i. Suppose that i initiates ℓ VSS instances during its turn. Then immediately after i's turn, σ ′ e appends sch(i) and ℓ snd (d, i) events to h e , followed by a done(i) event.
• If a has the form sch(d) and it is the kth time that the mediator is scheduled according to σ e , then the scheduler delivers to each agent i its proceed d,k message if there is one to deliver and then schedules agents cyclically (1, 2, . . . , n, 1, 2, . . .) until all agents i finish computing h i d,k and their share of each of the messages sent by the mediator during its kth turn. The scheduler also delivers to each agent i all the messages required by i for the computation of h i d,k and the shares of the mediator's messages immediately after they are sent. Suppose that the players determine that the mediator sends messages to j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j ℓ , in that order. Then
Note that the scheduler knows j 1 , . . . , j ℓ , and also knows when each player i terminates the computation of h i d,k (given our assumption that the scheduler knows the label of each message), since player i has terminated the computation of h i d,k if all messages related to this computation have been delivered and no player sent further messages when it was scheduled. Thus, all players i are guaranteed to have terminated the computation of h i d,k after the scheduler has gone through a full cycle of scheduling the players without any player sending any message required for the computation of h i d,k , for i = 1, . . . , n. (Recall that we are assuming for now that all players are honest.)
• If a has the form rec(i, d, ℓ), the scheduler delivers to i all the messages that i needs to compute the mediator's ℓth message to i. That is, the scheduler delivers the messages from other agents containing the shares of the ℓth message from the mediator to i. (By our inductive hypothesis, these messages have been sent but not yet delivered.) Then σ ′ e appends rec (i, d, ℓ) to σ e .
• If a has the form rec (d, i, ℓ) , the scheduler schedules the agents cyclically until all the agents finish computing (V SS, i, ℓ). More precisely, the scheduler delivers only the messages involved in protocol (V SS, i, ℓ), and does so immediately after they are sent, all of this while scheduling the agents cyclically until all the agents stop sending messages. Then σ ′ e appends rec(d, i, ℓ) to σ e .
Note that σ ′ e does not depend on the protocol τ T used by malicious agents. Suppose that π + π d and σ e are deterministic. For each input x, let J k i ( x) denote agent i's local history at the end of its kth turn in the unique history of ( π + π d , σ e , x). When the agents use π ′ , they simulate the computation of π + π d . Let K k i ( x) denote i's history at the end of i's kth turn in the simulation.
Although π ′ randomizes, since π + π d and σ e are deterministic, as we now show, the value of K k i ( x) is independent of this randomization.
Lemma 4. For all input profiles
We prove this lemma by proving a more general result that establishes a correspondence between histories of π and histories of π ′ . In π ′ , agents attempt to simulate all the events of π + π d , which include being scheduled and sending and receiving messages. By the construction of σ ′ e , all shares of a message sent by the mediator are received by its recipient virtually "at the same time" (more precisely, they are received one immediately after the other, with no other action in between). This allows us to define a correspondence between events in a history h of π + π d when used with scheduler σ e and events in a history h ′ of π ′ when used with scheduler σ ′ e . We start by defining the correspondence between events that are in an agent i's history in h and h ′ .
• The event that agent i is scheduled for the kth time in h corresponds to the event that i is scheduled after receving its kth proceed i message in h ′ . (Of course, i may not have received k proceed i messages in h ′ ; in this case, no event in h ′ corresponds to the event of i being scheduled for the kth time in h. Similar comments hold for all the other correspondences defined below.)
• The event that i sends its ℓth message in h corresponds to the event that i initiates its ℓth invocation of VSS in h ′ .
• The event that i receives the ℓth message sent by the mediator during its kth turn in h corresponds to the event that i receives a share of g k,ℓ (h d,k ) in h ′ . Note that g k,ℓ encodes the ℓth message sent by the simulated mediator during its kth turn given its local history h d,k .
Since the mediator is being simulated by all agents, events in the mediator's history in h do not correspond to single events in h ′ . Rather, they correspond to exactly n events, one for each agent. Scheduler σ ′ e guarantees that these n events occur consecutively in h ′ .
• The event that the mediator is scheduled for the kth time in h corresponds to the set of events in h ′ consisting of agent i being scheduled after receiving a proceed d,k message, for each agent i.
• The event that the mediator sends the ℓth message to agent j during its kth turn in h corresponds to the set of events in h ′ consisting of each agent i computing its share of g k,ℓ (h d,k ) (which encodes the ℓth message sent by the simulated mediator during its kth turn) and sending it to agent j.
• The event that the mediator receives j's ℓth message in h corresponds to the set of events in h ′ consisting of each agent i terminating the ℓth VSS invocation initiated by j.
Note that we have not included the done(i) events in the correspondence. Even though such events are needed to define then end of agenti's turn, they are redundant, since they come immediately before a sch(i) in i's local history.
An event in a history h ′ of π ′ is a simulation event if it could correspond to some event in another history h of π. More precisely, an event e in history h ′ is a simulation event if there exists a history h of π and an event e in h such that e ′ corresponds to e. Two histories h and h ′ of π and π ′ correspond if all non-done events in i's history in h correspond to some event in h ′ , all non-done events in the mediator's history in h correspond to n events in h, one for each agent, each simulation event in h ′ corresponds to some event in h, and the order of corresponding events in each agent i's history is preserved; more precisely, if e 1 and e 2 are two non-done events in i's (resp., the mediator's) history in h, and e ′ 1 and e ′ 2 are the events that correspond to e 1 and e 2 in i's history in h ′ , then e 1 precedes e 2 in h iff e ′ 1 precedes e ′ 2 in h ′ .
Lemma 4 follows from the following lemma, which is almost immediate from the construction of σ ′ e and π ′ . Although there are a number of histories in π ′ with scheduler σ ′ e and input x due to the randomization used in protocols such as VSS and CC, all of them correspond to the unique history in π when the scheduler plays σ e and players have input profile x.
Lemma 5. For all input profiles x, the unique history h of where the agents use π with scheduler σ e and input profile x corresponds to all the histories h ′ of where the agents use π ′ with scheduler σ ′ e and input profile x.
Note that Lemma 5 implies Lemma 4, since it states that agents simulate receiving and sending messages in exactly the same order with π ′ as they do with π + π d . Moreover, if the protocol is deterministic, the contents of those messages are uniquely determined.
If π + π d or σ e involve randomization, we can assume that the agents and mediator toss all the coins they need at the beginning (before they are first scheduled) and then use the outcomes of these coin tosses for their decisions. Fixing the outcome of such coin tosses makes the protocols deterministic, and an analogous argument to that used for Lemma 4 for each of the possible sequences of coin tosses guarantees that the agents' outputs are identically distributed in π + π d and in π ′ . Since ( π −T , τ T ) is just another protocol, it immediately follows from Lemma 4 that for all input profiles π( x, (T, τ T , σ e )) and π ′ ( x, (T, τ ′ T , σ ′ e )) are identically distributed for all possible protocols τ T for the malicious agents. This completes the proof that part (a) of the definition of "bisimulates" holds.
We now prove that part (b) of the definition of "bisimulates" holds. For this proof, we assume without loss of generality that malicious agents output their local history when running τ ′ T , since any output must be a function of their local history. For ease of exposition, we begin by giving the highlights of the construction of τ and σ e , given π ′ , τ ′ T , and σ ′ e ; we later present the construction in more detail. The idea for constructing τ T and σ e is that the adversary simulates what would occur if honest agents use π ′ −T , malicious agents use τ ′ T , and the scheduler uses σ ′ e . If the adversary in the protocol with the mediator knew the input x −T of honest agents, the adversary could perform the simulation before the protocol starts, and have malicious agents output the local history they have in the simulation, regardless of their history in π. However, the adversary does not know the honest agents' inputs. Thus, the adversary does the simulation assuming honest agents have some fixed input, which we take to be 0 −T . The following lemma makes precise the sense in which using 0 −T rather than x −T is "safe".
Lemma 6. Let J( π, A, x) be a random a random variable whose values are the values of the malicious agents, when the honest agents use π, given input profile x, and adversary A = (T, τ T , σ e ). Let σ V SS and σ CC be the implementation of VSS and CC, respectively, in a t-resilient secret-sharing scheme. Then for all adversaries A = (T, τ T , σ e ) and input profiles x and x ′ , we have
Lemma 6 implies that the adversary's history in an invocation of VSS and CC is independent of the actual inputs of the honest agents. This follows easily from the definition of t-resilience, since otherwise the adversary could deduce information about the honest agents' inputs given its local history. This means that much of the simulation can be performed by the adversary without having to know which inputs honest agents are using. Indeed, there are only three types of actions or decisions of an honest agent i that both depend on the honest agents' inputs and can affect the adversary's local history:
(a) how many time i invokes VSS after receiving a proceed i message; 
Clearly, the number of times that an honest agent invokes VSS affects the adversary's simulated history. For (b) and (c), if the adversary assumes that the honest agents have arbitrary inputs, the values received by agents in T will also be arbitrary, as opposed to being correlated to the agents' inputs (e.g., the messages sent by the mediator can depend in the messages received by honest agents, which ultimately depend on their inputs).
We show next that (a), (b) and (c) are the only decisions and actions taken by honest agents that the adversary cannot simulate. Suppose that the adversary had an oracle that could tell the adversary the number of times each honest agent i invokes VSS each time i is scheduled, and the values of each instance of
. Then the adversary could perform its simulation even without the honest agents' inputs: it could run its simulation with arbitrary inputs for honest agents. Whenever an honest agent i is scheduled after receiving a proceed i message, it could ask the oracle how many times i invokes VSS, and could simulate i performing that many invocations of VSS with arbitrary inputs, even without knowing the actual local history of i. Similarly, whenever honest agents have to broadcast or send an agent in T their share of
) takes in the actual history of π ′ . In its simulation, the adversary takes the set of shares that the honest agents broadcast or sent to agents in
respectively, regardless of the local history of the honest agents in the simulation (we will show when we present the more detailed construction how this can be done in such a way that the adversary's local history in its simulation is still consistent, despite the fact that in the simulation, honest agents may send different shares than the ones they computed). It follows from Lemma 6 that the adversary's local histories in the simulation with this oracle and its histories in a real interaction where honest players play π ′ with input x are identically distributed.
Unfortunately, the adversary does not have access to such an oracle. However, by the construction of π ′ , the values given by the oracle can be deduced from the history of the protocol with the mediator that the adversary is simulating, even without the benefit of an oracle. Specifically, if, for all honest agent i, each of the simulated histories h i,k in π ′ is equal to i's local history at the end of i's kth turn in π, and if each of the histories h d,k is equal to the local history of the mediator at the end of its kth turn; the number of times that an honest agent i invokes VSS after receiving its kth proceed i message but before receiving its (k + 1)st proceed i message in π ′ is the number of messages sent by i during its kth turn in π; f k,ℓ (h d,k ) is the recipient of the ℓth message sent by the mediator during its kth turn; and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) is the content of this message (which is known by the adversary if its recipient is in T ). Thus, if the adversary could schedule agents and deliver messages in π in such a way that, for each agent i and all k, the local histories h i,k in the adversary's simulation are the same as the local history of i in π at the end of i's kth turn, then we could dispense with the oracle. However, because the adversary does not know in the honest agents' input profiles, it cannot in general do this.
Fortunately, we do not need quite this much. Recall that the aim of the simulation is for the adversary to compute what history it would have in π ′ . Since |T | < n/4, Lemma 6 implies that the local histories of the agents in T and of the scheduler have the same distribution, independent of which values are being shared by honest agents. Therefore, to deduce the values given by the oracle, it suffices that the adversary schedules agents and delivers messages in π in such a way that, for each agent i ∈ T , the local histories h i,k in the adversary's simulation are the same as the local history of i in π at the end of i's kth turn, except possibly for i's input and the content of the messages sent and received by i. This means that the local histories h i,k and i's local histories in π at the end of its kth turn should consist of exactly the same sch, snd , rec, comp, and done events, and may differ only in the content of their rec and snd events. A more detailed construction of the adversary (T, τ T , σ e ) is given next.
For simplicity, we assume the adversary is a single entity that controls both the scheduler and the subset T of malicious agents. Given π, τ ′ T , σ ′ e , and x T , the adversary (T, τ T , σ e ). starts by performing a simulation of a history of ( π ′ −T , τ ′ T , σ ′ e , 0/ (T, x T ) ) using additional variables α i,k,ℓ and β i,k,ℓ with i, k, ℓ ∈ N , all initially set to a special value ⊥. Whenever one of the following events occur in the simulation, the adversary proceeds as described below.
(1) An agent i ∈ T is scheduled after receiving a proceed i message: In this case, σ e schedules i in π. If i sends ℓ messages when it is scheduled in π, then in its simulation, i is scheduled and invokes VSS ℓ times with input 0, regardless of i's local history i in the simulation.
(2) An honest agent i ∈ T terminates the share phase of (V SS, j, ℓ), with j ∈ T : Since n > 4t, the properties of VSS guaranteee that at least 2t + 1 honest agents in the simulation will also compute their share of (V SS, j, ℓ), and that these shares reconstruct a unique value mes j,ℓ . The scheduler σ e then schedules agent j in π, and j sends message mes j,ℓ to the mediator, tagged with label ℓ.
(3) An agent i ∈ T is the first honest agent to compute the permutation θ k computed in phase k2. Let m k be the cardinality of the domain of of θ k , and let (V SS, j 1 , ℓ 1 ), . . . , (V SS, j m k , ℓ m k ) be the invocations of VSS that are included in h d,k in Phase k1. The scheduler σ e delivers agent j θ k (1) 's ℓ θ k (1) th message, ..., and j τ (n) 's ℓ θ k (n) th message to the mediator in π, and then schedules the mediator.
(4) An agent i ∈ T terminates the invocation of CC instance for f k,ℓ (h d,k ). If the additional variable α i,k,ℓ = ⊥, then the adversary continues its simulation under the assumption that i's output of the CC invocation is α i,k,ℓ rather than the actual output. Otherwise, since n > 4t, the assumption made at the end of Section 3.2.6 guarantee that there is a set I of at least 2t + 1 honest agents in the simulation that have already computed their shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ). Let {s i,k,ℓ } i∈[n] be the unique full extension of the shares of the agents in I, and let j k,ℓ be either the receiver of the mediator's ℓth message during its kth turn or 0 if the mediator didn't send ℓ messages during its kth turn. The adversary samples uniformly at random a full j k,ℓ -extension {s ′ i,k,ℓ } i∈[n] of {s i,k,ℓ } i∈T and sets α i,k,ℓ to s ′ i,k,ℓ for all i ∈ [n]. The adversary continues its simulation by assuming that i's output of the CC invocation is α i,k,ℓ rather than s i,k,ℓ .
(5) An agent i ∈ T terminates the CC invocation for g k,ℓ (h d,k ), and k and ℓ are such that the mediator sent at least ℓ messages the kth time it was scheduled in π, and the recipient j k,ℓ of the ℓth message sent by the mediator the kth time it is scheduled in π is in T . If β i,k,ℓ = ⊥, then the adversary continues its simulation by assuming that i's output of the CC invocation is β i,k,ℓ rather than the actual output. Otherwise, let mes k,ℓ be the content of the ℓth message that the mediator sends the kth time it is scheduled (note that this value is known by j k,ℓ , and hence by the adversary). Since n > 4t, by the properties of CC, there is a set I with at least 2t + 1 honest agents that have computed their shares of g k,ℓ (h d,k ) in the simulation. Let {s ′′ i,k,ℓ } i∈[n] be the unique full extension of the shares of agents in I. The adversary samples uniformly at random a full mes k,ℓ -extension of {s ′′ i,k,ℓ } i∈T and sets β i,k,ℓ to s ′′ i,k,ℓ for each i ∈ [n]. Then the adversary continues its simulation by assuming that i's output of the CC invocation is β i,k,ℓ rather than s ′′ i,k,ℓ . (6) An agent i ∈ T reconstructs g k,ℓ (h d,k ) using VSS for some k and ℓ. In this case, the scheduler σ e delivers the ℓth message sent by the mediator to i the kth time the mediator was scheduled.
Note this construction for the adversary is well defined. The first and second clause guarantee that if an agent terminated (V SS, i, ℓ) in the adversary's simulation, then agent i sent a message tagged with label ℓ in the corresponding history of π. Also, whenever an honest agent finishes
, it must have terminated the computation of θ k , and (3) guarantees that the mediator has been scheduled at least k times (as needed for (4) and (5)).
The first step in proving that this construction of τ T and σ e satisfies clause (b) of the definition of t-bisimulation is to show that the adversary can simulate how many times each honest agent invokes VSS in π ′ . Recall that honest agents may initiate a new invocation of only after receiving a proceed message. Given a history h in π ′ , let a i,k (h) denote the number of times that agent i invokes VSS after receiving its kth proceed i message but before receiving the (k + 1)st proceed i message. Let ((a i,k (h)) i ∈T ) k∈N be the sequence of all such values, arranged lexicographically first by their k index and then by their i index. The following lemma, which follows immediately from the construction of τ T and σ e , shows that the distribution of these random variables is the same in π ′ and in the adversary's simulation.
Lemma 7. Fix T ⊆ [n] with |T | < n/4 and an input profile x. Let H be the distribution over histories when agents use ( π ′ −T , τ ′ T ) with scheduler σ ′ e and input x, and let H ′ be the distribution over histories in the adversary's simulation when agents use ( π −T , τ T ) with scheduler σ e and input x. Then S(H) T and S(H ′ ) T are identically distributed.
As we pointed out before, one of the only decisions made by honest agents that the adversary cannot simulate without additional information is the number of invocations of VSS that they perform when they are scheduled. Thus, this lemma shows that honest agents behave exactly the same in π ′ and in the adversary's simulation except for the values that they share using VSS and the values of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) sent to other players. However, by Lemma 6, exactly which values are shared using VSS does not affect the adversary's local history in its simulation. Therefore, the only events that might differ between the adversary's local history in π ′ and its local history in its simulation in π are those in which agents in T receive shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) from honest agents. In π ′ , f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) are the recipient and the content of the mediator's ℓth message during its kth turn, which are computed using CC with the simulated mediator's local history h d,k as input. Since the adversary assumes in its simulation that the values that honest agents share using VSS are all 0, the local histories h d,k that honest agents compute in the adversary's simulation would not follow the same distribution as their local histories if they used π ′ with their actual input. Thus, the shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) would also have a different distribution.
However, much as when dealing with VSS invocations, the adversary can use the mediator's actions in π as feedback for its simulation, and simulates that the shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) that honest agents send to players in T define secrets j k,ℓ and µ k,ℓ respectively, regardless of their local history, where j k,ℓ and µ k,ℓ are the recipient and the content of the mediator's ℓth message during its kth turn in π (note that the adversary does this for g k,ℓ (h d,k ) whenever j k,ℓ ∈ T , since otherwise it does not know the content of this message). By construction, this simulation proceeds in such a way that the shares that honest players send are "consistent" with the shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) that players in T could compute from their local history, in the sense that the shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ) sent by honest players together with the shares of those functions that players in T could compute are j k,ℓ -realizable and µ k,ℓ -realizable respectively. Note that if this weren't the case, the simulated local history of players in T could not occur if honest players played π ′ . The following lemma shows the correctness of this construction.
Given a history h of π ′ , let R T k,ℓ (h) denote the subsequence of rec events in h T of messages from agents not in T involving the computation of f k,ℓ (h d,k ) and g k,ℓ (h d,k ), using CC, the broadcast procedures for the shares of f k,ℓ (h d,k ), and the messages in which they send their shares of g k,ℓ (h d,k ).
Lemma 8. Fix T ⊆ [n] with n > 4|T | and an input profile Let π h ( x, A) be the distribution over histories when agents use π with adversary A and input x, and let A := (T, τ T , σ e )) and A ′ := (T, τ ′ T , σ ′ e ). Then R T k,ℓ ( π ′ h ( x, A ′ ) and R T k,ℓ ( π h ( x, A)) are identically distributed for all k, ℓ, where R T k,ℓ ( π h ( x, A)) is the distribution on sequences of rec events defined naturally by composing π h ( x, A) and R T k,ℓ .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is analogous to that given by Canetti in his proof of Lemma 4.31 [Canetti 1996, p. 91 ].
As we noted in Section 4.1, we implement CC in such a way that there is no correlation between the shares of different circuit computations. Thus, Lemma 8 can be easily generalized to show that (R k,ℓ (H)) k,ℓ∈N and (R k,ℓ (H ′ )) k,ℓ∈N are identically distributed. This, together with Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 implies Theorem 2(a) in the case that t = t ′ .
We now prove that π ′ (t, t ′ )-bisimulates π in the general setting, where 3t + t ′ < n and t ≥ t ′ . Let t ′′ = t − t ′ . Given a protocol π for n agents, consider the protocol ( π, η) for n + t ′′ agents, where the first n agents use π, while the last t ′′ agents use the null protocol, that is, they never send any messages. Given an adversary A ′ = (T, τ ′ T , σ ′ e ) in the setting with n agents (and no mediator), consider an adversary A ′′ = (T, τ ′ T , σ ′′ e ) in the setting with n + t ′′ agents in which σ ′′ e is a relaxed scheduler that acts just like σ ′ e , except that it might schedule agents in {n + 1, . . . , n + t ′′ }, although it never delivers their messages (note that since σ ′′ e does not deliver the messages sent by the last t ′′ agents, τ ′ is well defined even in the setting with n + t ′′ agents). Since 4t < n + t ′′ , following the same construction as in the case that t = t ′ , there exists an adversary A = (T, τ T , σ e ) such that ( π + η)( x, A ′′ ) = ( π + η)( x, A) for all input profiles x. Note that the scheduler σ e resulting from this construction is in fact a relaxed scheduler: since some of the VSS-share and CC instances in ( π + η) ′ are not guaranteed to terminate if σ ′′ e is relaxed, some messages might not be delivered by σ e .
Consider a scheduler σ ′′′ e in π that acts like σ e except that it does not schedule agents n+1, . . . , n+t. By construction, π( x, (T, τ T , σ as desired.
Finally, it remains to show that if |T | ≤ t ′ , σ ′′′ e is not relaxed. Given the adversaries A ′ and A ′′ defined above, consider an adversary A * := ( τ * T ′ , σ * e ) for ( π+η) ′ , such that T ′ = T ∪{n+1, . . . , n+t ′′ }, agents i ∈ T use τ ′ i , agents in {n + 1, . . . , n + t ′′ } send no messages, and σ * e acts just like σ ′′ e . By construction, ( π + η) ′ ( x, A * ) = ( π + η)( x, A ′′ )
In this case, σ * e is not a relaxed scheduler, since agents in {n + 1, . . . , n + t ′′ } never send any messages. Moreover, since |T ′ | = |T | + t ′′ < t, it follows that 4|T ′ | < n, and reasoning analogous to the previous case shows that there exists an adversary A = (T, τ , σ ′′′ e ) such that π( x, A) = π ′ ( x, A ′ ).
However, in this case, σ ′′′ e is not relaxed, since σ ′′ e was not.
Bounding the number of messages
As mentioned in Section 3.2.7, our construction of π ′ does not bound the number of messages sent. To see this, note that players compute h d,k each time that the mediator is scheduled in the simulation. Since the number of times that the mediator can be scheduled is unbounded, the number of messages sent in π ′ can be unbounded as well.
If the mediator π d is responsive, we show how we can modify the construction of Section 3.2.7 so as to bound the number of messages. The idea is that, since π d is responsive, agents don't need to simulate all the mediator's histories; it suffices to simulate only the histories in which that the mediator receives at least one message at every turn except possibly the first one. Note that this bounds the number of mediator turns that the players simulate by N , and thus guarantees that the expected number of messages in π ′ is polynomial in n and N since all primitives satisfy this property. To do this, agents run Section 4.3 with a simple modification in the computation of h d,k for k > 1. Instead of running a consensus protocol p j,ℓ,k for each VSS invocation (VSS, j, ℓ), players use an ACS computation C k with parameter m = 1, in which the accumulative set U i of player i consists of the pairs (j, ℓ) such that i has terminated (VSS, j, ℓ) but (j, ℓ) was not in any core set C k ′ with k ′ < k. Players then continue Phases k2 to k4 as usual, but take p j,ℓ,k = 1 iff (j, ℓ) ∈ C k . Since the players take the parameter m to be 1, |C k | ≥ 1; thus, it is guaranteed that in the simulation, the mediator has received at least one message at its kth turn.
The proof of correctness of this modified construction is identical to that given in Section 4.3 for the original construction.
The proof of Theorem 2(b)
If π + π d is in canonical form, the construction of π ′ is as in Section 3.2.7, except that if an honest player reconstructs a message containing "STOP", it terminates.
Suppose that a set I of at least 2t + 1 honest agents terminate. This means that all agents in I have computed their share of each of the mediator's messages. Thus, for each message µ sent by the mediator, each honest agent i will eventually receive a subset S I µ of shares such that (I, S I µ ) is µ-realizable. Recall that we assumed (at the end of Section 3.2) that the secret-sharing scheme used in π ′ is t-determinate. Thus, this subset of shares suffices for each honest agent to uniquely reconstruct µ, even with an adversary of size t: if a pair (I, S) with |I| ≤ 2t + 1 is µ-realizable, at least t + 1 agents from I are honest, and their shares uniquely define µ (and each of the other agents' shares). Thus, receiving a realizable set of at least 2t + 1 shares uniquely determines the secret being shared.
The proof of Theorem 3
The protocol π ′ for Theorem 3 is analogous to that for Theorem 2, except that we use the VSS and CC implementations of BKR instead of those of BCG. The proof of Theorem 3(a) is then identical to that of Theorem 2(a). Since it can be easily shown that the VSS and CC implementations constructed by BKR ǫ-(t, t + 1)-coterminate, Theorem 3(b) follows.
Conclusion
We have shown how to simulate arbitrary protocols securely in an asynchronous setting in a "bidirectional" way (as formalized by our notion of bisimulation). This bidirectionality plays a key role our application of these results in a companion paper; we believe that it might turn out to be useful in other settings as well. While this property holds for the BCG function simulation, proving that we can simulate arbitrary protocols so that it holds seems to be nontrivial.
Our construction may not be message-efficient in the general case. However, for responsive mediators, a small modification allows us to bound the expected number of messages by a function that is polynomial in the number of players n and the maximum number of messages N sent in the setting with the mediator, and linear in c, the number of gates in a circuit that implements the mediator's protocol. It is still an open problem whether all protocols π + π d can be implemented in a way that the expected number of messages sent by honest agents is bounded by some function of n, N , and c.
